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THE SEARCH FOR A NEW EQUILIBRIUM IN HABEAS

CORPUS REVIEW: RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTING VALUES
SUE M. COBB*

The author analyzes recent United States Supreme Court decisions, which change the scope of federal habeas corpus review, and
develops a model to promote a coherent view of the scope of habeas
corpus. This model, which is based upon vindicatingthe underlying
constitutional right, provides broad review of alleged violations
which undermine the reliability of the fact finding process and provides narrow review of other alleged violations.
When precedents are to be straightened out, and some are to be
avoided in favor of others, and language which has become too
tangled to guide is to be recast, the appropriate common law tool
is principle. . . .[I]f principle is to be sound principle with a
life-basis, a sense-basis, and a solid guidesomeness into emerging
conditions, then it must have an explicit reason which both displays its wisdom and helps to clarify its application.**
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INTRODUCTION

Thirty years ago Mr. Justice Frankfurter spoke of federal habeas corpus as an "untidy area" of the law.) Little has transpired
in the intervening years to change that characterization. The wide
range of problems embraced by habeas proceedings generate issues
of considerable subtlety and complexity-issues which have received extensive consideration by courts and commentators. Yet,
there remains a basic structural defect in the case law and commentaries: a failure to perceive and distinguish such complexities and
then to fashion a paradigm through which rational decision making
becomes possible.
* B.A. Stanford University, 1959; J.D. University of Miami School of Law, 1978; Judicial
Clerkship Intern, 1977, Judge Peter T. Fay, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. The author is grateful to the Honorable Peter T. Fay for inspiration and encouragement in the development of this article. The author also wishes to thank Irwin P. Stotzky,
Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law, for valuable criticisms
and suggestions.
** K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 434-35 (1960) (emphasis in original).
1. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 184 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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This article attempts to design a framework which will enable
thoughtful analysis and resolution of the myriad of problems surrounding federal habeas corpus relief. In order to design an adequate
model, the article begins with a brief historical perspective. Such a
perspective is necessary to lay a foundation for understanding the
problems and advancing a possible solution.
History, of course, is insufficient by itself to furnish the structure of a model. The next section of the article, therefore, moves to
more recent Supreme Court and congressional action. In this regard,
particular attention is paid to section 2254 of title 28 of the United
States Code, which deals with access of state prisoners to federal
courts.'
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). While the focus is on section 2254, much that can be said in
this regard applies also to section 2255 of title 28 of the United States Code which deals with
the right of federal prisoners in habeas proceedings. Section 2254 provides:
State custody; remedies in Federal courts
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court
shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,
or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the
existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights
of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right
under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented.
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,
a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State
court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ

and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written
finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be
presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise
appear, or the respondent shall admit(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the
State court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was
not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the
State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or
over the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding; or
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The development of the model will be completed in the final
section of the article. The intent is to suggest a model which will
promote a rational decision making process, a process that does not
exchange rationality for principle but includes both within its
framework. On another level the model suggests a mode of analysis
for other unsettled constitutional and criminal procedural issues.
II.

EXPANSION OF THE WRIT

While sketching a br.ief history of the Great Writ, it is well to
(7)

that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court

proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the
determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as
provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of
the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly

supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due
proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one
or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1)
to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by
the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as
a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest
upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous.
(e) If the applicant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced in such
State court proceeding to support the State court's determination of a factual
issue made therein, the applicant, if able, shall produce that part of the record
pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such
determination. If the applicant, because of indigency or other reason is unable to
produce such part of the record, then the State shall produce such part of the
record and the Federal court shall direct the State to do so by order directed to
an appropriate State official. If the State cannot provide such pertinent part of
the record, then the' court shall determine under the existing facts and circumstances what weight shall be given to the State court's factual determination.
(f) A copy of the official records of the State court, duly certified by the clerk of
such court to be a true and correct copy of a finding, judicial opinion, or other
reliable written indicia showing such a factual determination by the State court
shall be admissible in the Federal court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970).
Section 2243 of title 28 sets out the procedural requirements that a habeas court must
follow once a petition is filed. It instructs the court to either award the writ or enter an order
to show cause why the writ should not be granted. The section requires the writ or order to
be directed to the person having custody of the petitioner, and provides time limits for return
of the writ or response. It requires the respondent to make a return certifying the true cause
of detention. The section also provides procedures for setting a hearing and requires the
presence of the petitioner at such a hearing, if any issue of fact is presented in the petition.
Section 2243 allows the petitioner to deny any facts alleged in the return or allege other
material facts. It also provides for amendment of the return and the petitioner's response to
the return. The section also directs the court to "summarily hear and determine the facts
and dispose of the matter as law and justice requires." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:637

keep in mind that in law, as in nature, the weight of the pendulum
modulates its own swing.3 Historically, the writ of habeas corpus lay
to determine whether a person under custody was restrained in accordance with law. Since 1867, the lower federal courts have been
empowered through habeas corpus to reopen "all cases where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States. 4 Initially,
the state's burden on habeas corpus was merely to show that the
state court was one of competent jurisdiction.5 If jurisdictional rules,
the rules governing the distribution of authority to make decisions,
had been observed, any antecedent violations of procedural safeguards were immaterial.' Only challenges to nonjudicial detentions
without proper legal process or to confinement by the judgment of
a court without competence could be heard on federal review.
It is generally agreed that the first great broadening of the scope

of habeas corpus came with the approval of the post-Civil War
constitutional amendments.! Congress made the writ available to
state prisoners to provide a means of redress for those persons who
3. A recent provocative article suggests that one of the great advantages of a federal
system, and one of the important functions promoted by the writ of habeas corpus, is the
unique constitutional dialogue which is created between state governments and the federal
government. Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86
YALE L.J. 1035 (1977). This dialogue leads to a dialectical synthesis of principles and serves
as a driving force behind the articulation of rights. The federal courts are likely to present
the "utopian" viewpoint, whereas the state courts are likely to present the "pragmatic"
viewpoint. The authors suggest that the great advances of constitutional law in the 1950's
and 1960's were based on "explicating the dialectic between these opposing tendencies, rather
than defending one or another approach." Id. at 1050 n.78. One rather eloquent rationalization of dialecticism posits that:
A court bent upon validating current behavior soon loses the force of its legitimating mission by abstaining entirely from utopian perspectives upon an imperfect
world. Conversely, a Court bent upon wholesale utopian reform soon finds the
political capital necessary to effectuate change squandered, for it ignores the
historical base from which change must proceed and the presumptive claim that
this base has to legitimacy under the Constitution.
Id.
4. Act of February 5, 1867, ch. XXVII, 14 Stat. 385.
5. See, e.g., Ex parte Bridges, 4 F. Cas. 98, 106 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875).
6. See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURT AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 1238-40 (1953);
Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term; Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 84, 101-25 (1959). See generally Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus,
83 HARV. L. REv. 1038 (1970).
7. See generally Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1963); Oakes, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas
Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451 (1966); Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus,
supra note 6. The writ of habeas corpus was originally available only to federal prisoners
pursuant to the Judiciary Act of 1789. The expansion of the writ to include state prisoners
within the purview of the statutory language came by the Act of February 5, 1867, ch. XXVII,
14 Stat. 385.
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might be detained by uncooperative local authorities. Gradually,
the jurisdictional constraints gave way to the larger equitable concepts which served to broaden access to the federal forum.' By 1915,
the Supreme Court announced that the federal judges' job was "to
look beyond forms and inquire into the very substance of the matter,
to the extent of deciding whether the prisoner has been deprived of
his liberty without due process of law.''
In 1938, the Court decided the seminal case of Johnson v.
Zerbst,"' in which it stated that the sixth amendment "withholds
from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or
waives the assistance of counsel."" The Court permitted the question of whether there had been a "voluntary and knowing" waiver
to be reexamined de novo in the habeas corpus proceedings. The
Court emphasized the helplessness of the defendant who was forced
to defend himself and the absence of any effective remedy by way
of appeal for denial of his right to counsel. The opinion left unresolved, however, the issue of whether claimed denials of constitutional rights other than those specifically raised could also be examined de novo by a habeas corpus court. The Court did not explain
whether review should extend to an appraisal of evidence, which
would be necessary where the use of a coerced confession was alleged.
By the early 1940's the Court had openly abandoned its
"jurisdictional" approach and had begun overseeing federal substantive rights. Mere compliance with rules governing the distribution of authority would no longer be sufficient to avoid federal inquiry into the means used to protect constitutionally guaranteed
rights. In Waley v. Johnston the Court expressly acknowledged that
the writ was available to consider constitutional claims as well as
questions of jurisdiction. This federal inquiry might be pursued in
8. See, e.g., Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) (first habeas case that came from state
court to United States Supreme Court); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); Ex parte
Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). For an exhaustive history of section 2254, see Darr v.
Burford, 399 U.S. 200, 204-14 (1950).
9. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915); see Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923).
10. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Johnson involved a claim of denial of right to counsel by indigent
federal prisoners. There the Court formulated its famous test for the waiver of a federal right.
That test requires an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. at 464.
11. Id. at 463.
12. 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942). In Waley, the defendant claimed that his guilty plea had
been coerced by law enforcement officers. In response, the Court held that review would
always be available for constitutional claims dependent upon facts outside the record. The
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habeas corpus proceedings even though a determination of constitutional error could not be made on the face of the record of convic-

tion, but called for a reappraisal of evidence already examined in
the initial proceedings.' 3
In 1953 the Court fixed the position to which it has, to a substantial degree, recently returned. In Brown v. Allen, " the Court for
the first time unequivocally established that even if a state had fully
determined a constitutional claim, a federal habeas court could
reexamine the legal issues and, in its discretion, the facts. State
adjudication would carry weight but would not have res judicata
effect in a federal court.' 5 The Court emphasized that, with regard
to state prisoners, due process of law was not primarily concerned
with the adequacy of a state's corrective processes or with the prisoner's personal opportunity to avail himself of those processes.
Rather, due process was concerned with the correct application of
basic federal rules governing the decision to be made. In Brown the
Court concerned itself with the avoidance of any underlying constitutional error. Yet it is crucial to note that in the companion case
of Daniels v. Allen,'6 the Court rested its decision on the principle
Court stated the writ "extends also to those exceptional cases where the conviction has been
in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective
means of preserving his rights." Id. at 104.
13. Still as late as 1951, Justice Frankfurter indicated doubt as to whether a state
prisoner's claim of conviction by use of a coerced confession was reviewable on habeas corpus
unless the prisoner was able to show a further denial of constitutional right in the state's
failure to provide an adequate process for correction of the initial constitutional error. In
Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951), Justice Frankfurter opined that where the record
reflected that petitioner had duly raised, and the trial court duly litigated the constitutional
claims involved, the writ of certiorari should be dismissed for lack of a "properly presented
federal question." Justice Frankfurter pointed out that in collateral proceedings in the court
below there had been no showing that circumstances existed which warranted "a new and
independent inquiry into those determinations as a matter of federal right." Id. at 115-16
(Frankfurter, J. dissenting). The majority, however, remanded the case for a determination
of whether the state act in question provided an appropriate remedy for petitioners to assert
that their constitutional rights were infringed. If that finding was negative, petitioners' claims
would then be cognizable in federal district court. Id. at 111-12.
14. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). In Brown the prisoner asserted a denial of his constitutional right
by use of a coerced confession and by means of discrimination against Negroes in selection
of both the grand and petit juries. At trial petitioner had been represented by competent
counsel and his claims were presented to the trial court. He duly appealed from his conviction to the state's highest court and received a full review of his claims. That court upheld
his conviction. He applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and the writ was
denied. The Supreme Court ruled that the prisoner was entitled to a full review of his constitutional claim from a federal district court. The Brown position was reaffirmed in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
15. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953).
16. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Daniels, heard by the Court with Brown and two other habeas
petitions, was a case in which two prisoners had failed to obtain a decision on the merits of
their federal constitutional claims from the state's highest court. Daniels followed the precise
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that the authority of the states to regulate and enforce the procedure
of their own courts deserved to be respected, and that a state prisoner lost his right to review of his federal claim in a federal court if
he did not utilize the state procedures made available to him.
Thus, by 1953 there were two potential paths available to a
state prisoner to obtain federal habeas corpus review. When the
petitioner was in some fashion impeded procedurally in presenting
his case, such as by the lack of or inadequacy of his counsel or by
excusable ignorance of facts or law, the prisoner was given the benefit of habeas corpus on the grounds relied upon in Waley v.
Johnston, that "the writ is the only means of preserving his right."' 7
On the other hand, where petitioner satisfied state procedural requirements by presenting his contentions in state courts to the fullest extent of available procedures, his constitutional claim would be
reviewable in federal habeas corpus proceedings under the Brown
rationale. Contentions not made in conformance with state procedures, however, would be dismissed under the Daniels rationale.
Such was the state of the law until 1963 when the Supreme
Court announced its famous decision in Fay v. Noia,5 sweeping
away the final barriers to broad collateral reexamination of state
criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Fay was
decided the same day as Townsend v. Sain, Gideon v. Wainpattern of Brown's case in the state court up until the last day for filing the appeal papers in
the state supreme court. Daniel's counsel had the papers ready and would have filed them
on time if he had dropped therin a mail box. Instead, he hand delivered them the next day
at the time they would have arrived by mail. The state supreme court decided that the appeal
had been filed too late and refused to consider it. The Supreme Court of the United States
held that since the state court judgment rested on a reasonable application of the state's
legislative procedural rules, a ground that would have barred direct review by the Court, the
district court lacked authority to grant habeas relief. The tensions underlying Brown and
Daniels could hardly be more illustrative of administrative problems in a federalist system
devoted to the concept of ordered liberty.
17. 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1942). For an analysis of this case, see note 12 supra.
18. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Noia was convicted of felony murder on the basis of his allegedly
coerced confession. The trial judge stated that he had seriously considered disregarding the
jury's recommendation of mercy and sentencing Noia to death. Id. at 396 n.3. The state
contended that since Noia had bypassed the state appellate process, there was an adequate
and independent state ground for conviction. However, the Court held that such procedural
defaults did not bar federal habeas to a petitioner who had deliberately bypassed state
procedures, where the circumstances of Noia's failure to appeal did not constitute an intelligent and understanding waiver. Id. at 438-40. The Court reasoned that, in light of the judge's
expressed sentiment at sentencing, Noia's decision not to appeal was not a tactical or strategic move, or a deliberate avoidance of state procedures, but was a choice between accepting
life imprisonment or pursuing an appeal which "if successful, might well have led to a retrial
and death sentence." Id. at 440.
19. 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Townsend, a capital case in which the petitioner claimed his
confession was coerced by the use of truth serum, outlined the duty of federal habeas courts
to conduct fact finding hearings with respect to petitions brought by state prisoners.
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wright, and Douglas v. California.' Fay and Townsend were to
become the vehicles by which the Warren Court intended to protect expanded due process rights." The Warren Court thus created remedial protection for the constitutionalization of expanded
due process rights in the criminal procedure area by means of increased availability of federal habeas corpus."5
The Court in Fay held that a federal court could exercise jurisdiction regardless of whether federal claims had been raised in the
state courts. Habeas corpus relief would always be available where
the detention was in violation of federal law, subject only to the
limitation that such relief not be granted to one who "deliberately
sought to bypass" the orderly adjudication of his federal defenses
in state court. "Deliberate bypass" was deemed the equivalent of
the "knowing and intelligent" waiver standard of Johnson v.
Zerbst.14 Both standards were subject to the same test and the presence of either was expressly predicated on the considered choice of
the petitioner." The goal was to assure that no defendant would
20. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
21. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
22. Federal supervision of availability of habeas corpus was entirely consistent with the
Court's devotion to equality both in and outside of the criminal justice field. Its policy of
selective incorporation, including annexation of remedial protection in the form of injunctive
relief in areas such as civil rights, illuminated the underlying philosophy of federally guaranteed equality before the law. For the principal decisions intending to accomplish this, see In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)(proof beyond reasonable doubt); Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969)(fifth amendment prohibition of double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968)(sixth amendment right to jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14
(1967)(sixth amendment right to compulsory process); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967)(sixth amendment right to speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth
amendment right to confront witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)(fifth amendment
right to remain silent); Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)(fourth amendment exclusionary
rule); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)(sixth amendment right to counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)(eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)(fourth amendment exclusionary rule). See
also Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019 (1977); Kurland, The Supreme
Court, 1963 Term-Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARv. L. REV. 143 (1964).
23. See Friendly, supra note 22. See also McFeely, Habeas Corpus and Due Process:
From Warren to Burger, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 533, 537-40 (1976).
24. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). For an analysis of this decision, see note 10 supra.
25. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963). Subsequent Supreme Court cases have wrestled with the concept of deliberate bypass. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 223
(1973)(failure to raise claim before trial waives right to collateral attack); Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969)(failure to appeal from state conviction does not per se prohibit
federal habeas relief, although it is one of the factors federal courts must consider in determining whether there was a bypass of state review); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 442, 451

(1965)(decision of counsel relating to trial strategy, even when made without the consultation
of defendant, would bar direct federal review of claims thereby foregone except where "the
circumstances are exceptional"). See also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Francis v Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Estelle v. Williams,

19781

HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW

relinquish a guaranteed right without full understanding.
With the ruling in Fay, the two paths to federal habeas review
became a freewfiy.2 1 The Court's broadening of habeas corpus insured the active participation of federal courts in the construction
and protection of constitutional rights. Justice Brennan made this
underlying premise abundantly clear when he stated "it is the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary
federal judicial review." 2 This "manifest policy" enunciated in Fay,
favoring independent federal adjudication free from the impact of
structural deficiencies in state criminal process, assured the federal
judiciary full supervisory authority over federal rights. Although
Townsend v. Sain may be viewed as supporting the presumption of
correctness of state factfinding it also may be seen as securing independence of the federal forum from state factfinding processes.18
425 U.S. 501 (1976). See generally Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The
Isolation Principle, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 78 (1964).
26. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942), had been concerned only with constitutional
rights which could not have been vindicated except collaterally. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953), was concerned with avoiding constitutional error, but deferred to state procedural
rules. Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) epitomized such deference. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963), essentially obliterated the distinctions developed in those cases and allowed

review of all claims absent a deliberate bypass, by holding that failure to exhaust state
remedies applied only to those remedies still open to petitioner at the time of his application
for federal review. Thus where a petitioner would be denied state review because of a failure
to make a timely appeal, as in Daniels, federal review became available.
27. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963).
28. 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Townsend held that federal courts upon petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine a constitutional claim if the
petitioner "did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court." Id. at 312.
The Court listed six situations in which a hearing would be mandatory, including cases in
which (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state
factual determination was not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the factfinding
procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4)
there was a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were
not adequately developed at the state court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appeared that
the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. In
ascertaining when a hearing is mandatory the determination is made upon a review of the
answer, the transcript record of state proceedings, and the expanded record if there is one.
Id. at 319.
In 1966 Congress amended section 2254 of title 28 to conform, in large measure, to the
Townsend criteria. Act of November 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-710, 80 Stat. 1105. The amendment clearly places the burden upon the petitioner, when there has already been a state
hearing, to show that it was not a fair or adequate hearing, in order to force a federal
evidentiary hearing. Since the function of an evidentiary hearing is to try issues of fact, such
a hearing is unnecessary when solely issues of law are raised. In those situations where a
hearing is not mandatory, the hearing is in the discretion of the judge. 372 U.S. at 318. If a
judge decides that an evidentiary hearing is neither required nor desirable, he shall make such
a disposition of the petition "as law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970). The
incongruity of the requirement in section 2255 that a hearing must be held for federal prison-
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The arguments concerning Fay's principle of independent federal review were immediately forthcoming. Pro-Fay forces adopted
the point of view stressing the unreliability of state courts, and
emphasizing the importance and particular characteristics of a federal forum which make federal courts the most logical arenas in
which to hear federal constitutional claims. 9 Critics of Fay generally fell into two categories: (1) those who considered reduction of
constitutional error an end in itself;3" and (2) those who criticized
federal review as wasteful of judicial resources, counterproductive
to the ends of finality, and a usurpation of state rights."' In viewing
the most recent Supreme Court cases it appears that the critics of
Fay are prevailing.
Before examining the recent decisions, however, it is instructive
to look at recent congressional activity in this area. Although legisers on review where such requirement was discretionary with regard to state prisoners under
section 2254, stems from congressional effort to encourage and strengthen state factfinding
procedures. See S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). That this purpose is accepted
and fostered by the Supreme Court'is reaffirmed in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
For a statement of the role of Townsend as the criterion for when a hearing in federal habeas
is mandatory, see Notes of the Advisory Committee, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in
the United States District Courts, Rule 8, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. fol. § 2254 at 1132-34
(West Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of September 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-426, 90 Stat.
1334. See also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Most importantly, the 1976 amend.
ments set aside the power of a judge to dismiss a second or successive petition, even if new
grounds of relief were alleged, if the judge determined that prior failure to assert such grounds
was not excusable. Dismissal would be permitted only if the prior failure to assert such
grounds constituted an abuse of the writ. The amendments also establish a rebuttable
presumption that the passage of more than five years from the time of the judgment of conviction to the time of filing a habeas petition is prejudicial to the state. The presumption

does not arise if the time is less than five years.
29. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 6, at 1057.
The emphasis upon differences of an institutional nature was specifically rejected as a forceful
rationale in Stone v. Powell. "Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some judges in years past, we are
unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 493 n.35 (1976). Nonetheless, the argument persists that independent federal review is
necessary to ensure that constitutional rights are adequately protected and to provide a forum
for the dialogue essential to definition and creation of constitutional rights. See generally
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 3.
30. See, e.g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 142 (1970). See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973)(Powell, J., concurring). This approach views the relevant question to be whether or
not an innocent man has been convicted.
31. See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,
76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 451 (1963). Some would attribute this view to Justice Rehnquist upon
a reading of his opinion in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Those promoting this
view favor a cutback in availability of federal habeas corpus and give little credence to the
value of the habeas forum in federal-state dialogues as a means of cooperative definition of
constitutional rights.
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lative proposals to modify federal habeas corpus for state prisoners
began in the 1950's3" it was not until 1966 that Congress enacted a
revision of the federal habeas corpus statutes. 3 Immediate and continued criticism focused on the amended statutes' failure to accord
conclusive finality to state convictions. 4 A proposed amendment to
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968 would have
drastically limited federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. 5 That
amendment was defeated, largely because of fears concerning its

constitutionality. In 1973 Senate Bill 567 was proposed to the Sen.

ate Judiciary Committee.37 The bill appeared in response to claims
by Fay's critics that prevailing habeas corpus procedures permitted
thousands of frivolous petitions to be filed causing delays and overburdening the state and federal judiciaries, that the potential for
relitigation undermined prisoner rehabilitation by acceptance of
punishment, and that unnecessary tension was fostered between
state and federal courts. The bill was intended to sharply limit the
availability of a federal forum to state prisoners. It provided that
any state determination of a constitutional claim would be conclusive, subject only to Supreme Court review; that federal habeas
corpus relief would be available only if state adjudication of an
alleged constitutional violation was unobtainable through no fault
of the prisoner; and that the alleged violation must involve a right,
the primary purpose of which was the protection of the reliability
of the state court factfinding process, and that without the violation, a different result probably would have occurred."
32. See, e.g., Pollak, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners:
CollateralAttack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50 (1956).
33. Section 2244 of title 28 was amended to create limited res judicata, barring petitioners from prosecuting further claims if they had either a district court hearing or Supreme
Court review of an issue, unless the petitioner produced facts not previously adjudicated. See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(c)(1970). Section 2254 was revised to make a state's findings of fact
presumptively correct and put the burden on the petitioner to prove otherwise. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(e)(1970). The purpose of this revision was to encourage states to provide adequate
trial procedures and post-conviction remedies that would develop a complete record of the
facts and thus make federal evidentiary hearings unnecessary. See S. REP. No. 1797, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). See also note 28 supra.
34. The National Association of Attorneys General and the Department of Justice were
the two main critics. See generally Note, Proposed Modification of Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners-Reform or Revocation?, 61 GEO. L.J. 1221 (1973).
35. S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CONG. REc. 11,189 (1968). For the complete text as
it emerged from committee, see 114 CONG. REC. 11,189 (1968).
36. See Paschal, The Constitutionand Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605, 606-07.
37. S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 2220 (1973). An identical bill had
previously been in the Senate and a similar bill was introduced in the House during the
Ninety-Second Congress. See S. 3833, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 13,722, 92d Sess.
(1972). These bills renresented the combined suggestions of the National Association of Attorneys General and the Department of Justice. 119 CONG. REC. 2220. See note 34 supra.
38. Letter from Attorney General Richard Kleindienst to Representative Emanuel Celler
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Senate Bill 567, if adopted, would have barred federal habeas
corpus review of a substantial constitutional question if the question: (1) had been determined; (2) could have been determined but
was not determined; or, (3) still could be determined by the state
courts. Once a state court had ruled on the merits of an issue, either
on direct appeal or collateral attack, the only possible remedy would
be direct review by the Supreme Court. Since almost every issue
presented on habeas review would have been previously determined
by the state under the doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies, the
revision would have, to a great extent, barred habeas petitioners
from alleging either that the state had incorrectly decided a constitutional issue or that the state provided inadequate procedures for

determining a congtitutional igue. 39
Senate Bill 567 treated failure to utilize an available state remedy as a deliberate bypass which barred relief on habeas. This provision, if approved, would have drastically limited Fay v. Noia. In
limiting Fay, the bill would have caused a forfeiture of rights by
both "knowing and intelligent" waiver and by inadvertent procedural error. Only for a clearly unintelligent and involuntary bypass
of a constitutional right would habeas review be allowed. Consequently, the discretion of federal judges to grant relief would have
been greatly diminished. Although the Bill was not reported out of
committee, within four years the Supreme Court had provided almost identical guidelines for review of federal habeas petitions.
III.

THE RECENT DECISIONS:

Estelle, Francis, Sykes

AND

Stone v.

Powell
In four opinions handed down in the last two terms,4' the Supreme Court has retreated from the position of Fay v. Noia,4" se(June 22, 1972), reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 2220 2(a) (1973).
39. Under existing law, exhaustion is not necessary if there are circumstances rendering
such processes ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1970). Cf.
United States ex rel. Reis v. Wainwright, 525 F.2d 1269, 1272 (5th Cir. 1976)(petitioner did
not have to present her claim of incompetent retained counsel to the state court before seeking
federal habeas relief because such a resort would be futile where, "[in an uninterrupted line
of cases Florida had steadfastly refused to recognize incompetence of privately retained
counsel as a valid basis for post-conviction relief").
40. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976);
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). Estelle,
Francis and Sykes are essentially concerned with the problems of determining when the.
failure to properly raise a constitutional claim in a state proceeding forecloses review by a
federal court. Stone addresses the foreclosure of review after raising a constitutional claim in
state court. All deal with the issue of when a state procedural rule may be deemed an
adequate state ground precluding federal review of the underlying constitutional rights.
41. It will be remembered that the Fay Court articulated three principal concepts: (1)
that there would be no waiver of right to a federal habeas corpus forum, absent "deliberate
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verely limiting the discretion of the federal courts on habeas review
of state decisions." In these cases the Court has reassessed the appropriate scope of federal post-conviction relief to be accorded state
prisoners outside of the guilty plea context. 3 The majority has reemphasized the basic precepts of Brown and Daniels" and has rejected
the redundancy concept, the idea of independent federal review,
articulated in Fay. Thus, where petitioner has failed to follow state
procedures, federal habeas corpus review is barred unless the prisoner has been somehow prevented from effectively utilizing those
procedures. Where a prisoner has complied with all state procedures, however, the federal habeas court must review the legal issues raised by the prisoner and may review the factual issues.
bypass" of state remedies; (2) that there would be no automatic waiver attributed to the
petitioner by acts or omissions of his counsel; and (3) that there would be no preclusion of
federal review on the basis of state adjudication. All three of these elements have been
eviscerated.
42. Not surprisingly, the imposition of due process on the states was also checked. See
note 22 supra. In three decisions in the 1975 term, the Court mandated a higher threshold
for showing a legally protected liberty or property interest. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). In
another noteworthy decision, the Court found a constitutionally protected interest and ruled
that state remedies were capable of protecting that interest. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1977).
43. The scope of review addressed in the three recent decisions was exclusive of, but quite
closely related to, the scope of review in the guilty plea cases discussed in the Brady trilogy:
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The Brady trilogy was the first broad contraction of Fay's parameters. There, the Court validated the use of a negotiated plea and established that for most purposes, a voluntary plea entered upon advice of counsel, operates as a
"break in the chain of events" sufficient to cut off antecedent constitutional claims. Brady
adopted the Johnson v. Zerbst "knowing and intelligent waiver" standard, as redefined by
Judge Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals:
A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including
the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or
his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue
unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their
nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g.
bribes).
Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev'd on other
grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
In Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), collateral relief was denied after entry of a
guilty plea in a capital case, when petitioner wished to attack the composition of the grand
jury which had indicted him; Tollett, carried to its furthest extention, would extinguish all
antecedent constitutional claims so long as the circumstances of the plea were consistent with
controlling standards of voluntariness, intelligence, and the right to counsel. But see Blackledge v. Perry, 427 U.S. 21 (1977)(a defendant who calls into question the right of the state
to prosecute him at all, for example, when he claims he has been subjected to double jeopardy, may seek habeas review in spite of his guilty plea).
44. See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra. Sykes expressly states that the Brown rule
is in no way changed. Sykes deals only with contentions of federal law which were not resolved
on the merits in the state proceedings. 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
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Certainly a number of people bemoan this retrenching. Supporting the Court's move in this area, one argument posits that the
goal of insuring that states protect expanded due process rights has
been achieved and that with such protection assured, the Burger
Court is simply returning to a more balanced position. Central to
such a position is the idea that "there is room not only for a doctrine
of conscious waiver of federal constitutional rights but for a distinct
doctrine of inadvertent loss of them by inexcusable procedural default."4 There is considerable agreement that Fay served its purpose well, greatly enhancing the likelihood that justice would be
done without resort to a federal court." In analyzing the right to
federal review, if one reaches the conclusion that much has been
accomplished with respect to state protection of federal rights, then
it is also clear that the values of comity, efficiency and finality
assume significantly greater weight. It is, therefore, from one historical perpective, quite logical for the present Court to decide that
where a prisoner has an unimpeded opportunity for an adequate
appeal, that is, effective assistance of counsel and full and fair access to the facts and the applicable law, habeas ought not to be
allowed "to do broader service than would have been done on
appeal. '"4

There are respectable arguments against this rationale. The
elimination of "independent" federal review brings forth a plethora
of renewed arguments regarding the "special competency" of the
federal tribunal." Those arguments are augmented by the notion
that habeas review is crucial to the formation of rights and remedies
by virtue of its position as a unique forum for discussion of constitutional views.49 Furthermore, it is arguable that reconciling the un45. See Hart, supra note 6, at 101-18, 119. Both waiver and forfeiture concepts promote
the ends of efficiency and finality. Forfeiture does not necessarily mean, however, that every
technicality of state law need be enshrined. Uncompromising deference to state procedural
law would be extraordinarily difficult to reconcile with a policy of flexible reexamination of
state court substantive determinations. It was just this problem, the problem of creating some
sort of logically defensible symmetry, that underlay the demand for stricter scrutiny of the
"reasonableness" of state court procedures during the Brown/Daniels reign. That demand
plus, of course, the Warren Court's devotion to equality concepts, culminated in the Fay
decision. For .an excellent discussion of waiver, see Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A
Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55 Tax. L. REV. 193 (1977).
46. See, e.g., 63 IOWA L. REv. 392 (1977). For informative discussions of the response of
state courts to the broad demand to protect due process rights, see Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protectionof Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); 29 STAN. L. REV.
297 (1977).
47. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942)(addressing considerations of orderly appellate procedure and the necessity for the doctrine of waiver).
48. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 6.
49. Compare Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), with Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S.
86 (1923). See generally Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 3.
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derlying philosophies of Brown (flexible federal review of substantive rights) and Sykes (deference to state procedural rules) applies
an undesirable type of pressure on state judicial systems. It suggests
to state courts that the more industrious they are in considering
federal constitutional claims of state prisoners on the merits, the
more often they will be subject to the delays and the "indignity" of
federal court review. On the other hand, the more cleverly enacted
are their procedural traps, the surer they will be of protecting their
decisions from federal review. 0 For present purposes, however, one
should recognize that the recent cases have limited the scope of
discretionary federal review.
Estelle v. Williams and Francis v. Henderson were decided on
the same day. In Estelle, Chief Justice Burger, expressing the view
of six members of the Court, held that although a state cannot,
consistent with fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection requirements, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury
while dressed in identifiable prison clothing, failure to make an
objection to the court was sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation.5' Justice
Brennan, in his dissent, argued strongly that the Court "has abrogated the traditional waiver standard for rights affecting the fairness and accuracy of fact finding process""2 and imposed instead
automatic forfeiture. Justices Powell and Stewart, in their concurring opinion, made some attempt to ease the potential rigidity of the
decision, by pointing out that "even when confronted by such a
procedural default, discretion might sometimes be exercised to overcome conviction on the familiar principles of plain error."5
In Francis,5 4 the Court extended to state prisoners the rule set
50. See Hart, supra note 6, at 117-18.
51. 425 U.S. 501 (1976). Estelle involved a jury trial for assault with intent to commit
murder with malice. Petitioner had asked his jailor, prior to trial, to allow him to wear civilian
clothes to trial. The request was denied and neither petitioner nor his retained counsel
objected in court. The Chief Justice stressed the importance of participation of counsel in
holding that petitioner had no right to federal review. Justice Powell, joined by Justice

Stewart, concurred, expressing the view that a tactical choice or procedural default of the
nature involved should operate as a matter of federal law to preclude the later raising of the
substantive constitutional right. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented.
Justice Stevens did not participate. For a recent acceptance of the Estelle approach, see
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 558 F.2d 691 (3d Cir. 1977).
52. 425 U.S. 501, 523 n.5 (1976).
53. Id. at 514 n.2.
54. 425 U.S. 536 (1976). A 17 year old Negro petitioner had been duly convicted in state
court. He was represented at trial by uncompensated appointed counsel. He did not appeal
the state court conviction. Petitioner claimed for the first time, on collateral attack in the
state court, that the state had excluded daily wage earners from the grand jury, resulting in
exclusion of a disproportionate number of blacks. Francis's claim would seemingly have been
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out in Davis v. United States.55 In Davis, the Court established a
rule denying collateral relief on section 2255 motions by federal
prisoners challenging an unconstitutional grand jury indictment,
absent a showing of cause for the failure to challenge and a showing
of actual prejudice where the merits of defendant's constitutional
claim had been entertained either on direct or collateral review by
the state court. Francis imposes this cause and actual prejudice
standard on state defendants seeking federal review. The Court
noted that there was power in the federal court to entertain an
application, but rested its holding on "considerations of comity and
concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice."56
In Wainwright v. Sykes 7 the Court again addressed the issue
of a state procedural rule as an adequate and independent state
ground precluding federal habeas review.5" Interpreting section
cognizable under Fay, absent a deliberate bypass. However, the Court chose to emphasize
the valid interest of the state in requiring that objection be made before a retrial became too
difficult. Id. at 540-41. The Court held that the petition for habeas review must be denied
unless actual prejudice could be shown to have resulted from the composition of the grand
jury.
Francis did not attempt to distinguish Fay. This is possibly the result of disagreement
among the justices as to the proper scope of habeas review outside the grand jury discrimination context. The latter category is rather easily differentiated due to the nature of the grand
jury function. If the defendant is determined at trial to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
it is difficult to argue that a grand jury would not have found probable cause to indict, had
it been free of discriminatory influences. See Israel, CriminalProcedure, the Burger Court,
and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1357-66 (1977).
55. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
56. 425 U.S. 536, 539 (1976).
57. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Petitioner had been convicted of third-degree murder. Upon
arrest, the defendant had been given his Miranda warnings. He declined counsel and confessed. At trial, defendant's court appointed attorney failed to object to the admission of his
inculpatory statements. By virtue of the state's contemporaneous objection rule, defendant
thereby waived the claim. He later maintained that he did not understand the Miranda
warnings because he was intoxicated, and that his confession was, therefore, involuntary.
Justice Rehnquist defended the Court's decision in terms of respect for state rules of finality
of judgment. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell and Stevens
joined. Chief Justice Burger filed a concurring opinion in which he emphasized that the claim
before the Court related to events during trial, and that "trial decisions are of necessity
entrusted to the accused's attorney," 433 U.S. at 94, and that the Fay-Zerbst standard of
"knowing and intelligent waiver" was simply inapplicable. Id. Justice Stevens concurred on
the grounds that the decision was "consistent with the way other federal courts have actually
been applying Fay," that the petitioner had competent counsel, that there was no fundamental-unfairness, and that the deterrent purpose of the Miranda rule was inapplicable. Id. at
94-96. Justice White concurred in the result, indicating a preference for application of the
"harmless error" standard and expressing a desire to avoid shifting the burden of proving
actual prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 97-99. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justice Marshall joined. In attacking the Court's acceptance of forfeiture of defendant's
rights by the'decisions of his counsel, Justice Brennan reemphasized the need for closer
scrutiny of lawyers' actions. Id. at 99-118.
58. The Court suggests that Sykes involved a waiver, a "knowing and intelligent" relinquishment of a right, however, the Court imposed the forfeiture standard of "cause and
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2254, the Court extended the rule of Francisto all claims not timely
raised during trial by counseled defendants. That is, even where the
merits of the constitutional claim were not reached, due to lack of
compliance with state procedural rules, the defendant would have
the burden of showing cause for and actual prejudice from the procedural default. 5 The effect of the new standard is to shift the burden
of proof from the state to secure a prima facie determination of
voluntariness to the defendant to show both cause for and prejudice
from the procedural default. The Court presumably intends to hold
the petitioner to a standard of reasonable diligence consistent with
an attempt to invoke equitable relief. The majority apparently feels
that the rule will be a flexible standard with adequate protection
guaranteed to the defendant who may be in danger of suffering a
miscarriage of justice."
In Estelle, Francisand Sykes the Court emphasized the importance of finality and efficiency.6 Because the result in each case is
to recognize either a waiver or forfeiture, without analyzing the
substantive nature of the underlying right, it is crucial to the
Court's conclusions that state procedural protections are fair and
prejudice" upon the defendant. The apparently interchangeable. use of "waiver" and
"forfeiture" adds even more confusion to an already hazy area. See Westen, Away From
Waiver. A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75
MICH. L. REv. 1214 (1977).
59. To summarize the major steps with respect to state procedure: Daniels stated that a
state procedural rule may bar federal review; Fay stated that state procedural rules are no
bar unless there is a deliberate bypass (using the same standard as waiver). Davis, purportedly interpolating congressional intent with respect to the statutory language of section 2255,
required a showing of cause, rather than a Johnson v. Zerbst waiver, to obtain review. The
Court noted that the phrase "the Court for cause shown may grant relief from waiver" was
adopted by Corgress pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 377 (1970). 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973). The Davis
rule was extended in Francisand Sykes. The cause and prejudice standard was thus incorporated by reference into the body of law governing section 2254 petitions. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
Davis, Francis, and Sykes appear to have been disposed of on the prejudice aspect. Left
unresolved is what constitutes cause. Not surprisingly, the Court has declined to define the
two elements, but noted that the Francisrule is "narrower than the standard set forth in dicta
in Fay v. Noia." 433 U.S. at 88-89. The Court seemed to accept Justice Frankfurter's admonition in his Brown opinion which sounded the wisdom of retaining flexibility in this area:
"experience cautions that the very nature and function of the writ of habeas corpus precludes
the formulation of fool-proof standards which [all] District Judges can automatically
apply." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 501 (1953).
To attempt rigid rules would either give spuriously concrete form to wide-ranging
purposes or betray the purposes by strangulating rigidities. . . .The fact that we
canno t formulate rules that are absolute or of a definiteness almost mechanically
applicable does not discharge us from the duty of trying to be as accurate and
specific as the nature of the subject permits.
Id. at 513. The Fifth Circuit has made at least one attempt to interpret the "cause and
prejudice" criteria. See Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977).
60. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977).
61. See note 40 supra.
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adequate and that the defendant had the effective assistance of
counsel. 2 If a defendant has been counseled, he is deemed to have
acted of his own volition. This line of analysis is nearly synonymous
with that developed in the guilty plea cases: a tactical choice by a
counseled defendant defeats antecedent claims.

trilogy,64

3 Under

this trilogy

and the Brady
the Court need not investigate the underlying right, but need only address the question of adequacy of counsel
and adequacy of the forum.
In the sense that the Court is dealing with structural elements
prescribing "the rules of the road" and providing adequate notice,
it may be that a categorical approach to preclusion of federal review
will remain acceptable to the majority and is to be effectuated even
where the right involved is deemed fundamental. A different standard, however, seems to apply with regard to questions which go to
the sufficiency of the evidence.
Stone v. Powell5 is logically consistent with Estelie, Francis
and Sykes in that state determinations are given res judicata effect.
Stone, however, differs in approach from the above cases. In Stone
the Court initially looked to the substantive right involved and
questioned the manner in which the procedure at issue furthered or
obstructed justice. After examining the history of the exclusionary
rule and its deterrent value, Justice Powell utilized a cost-benefit
analysis and balanced the interests safeguarded by the rule against
competing social interests. The degree of certainty of guilt weighed
62. The Court equates "counseled" with the concept of volitional choice underlying the
Johnson v. Zerbst waiver standard and Fay's "deliberate bypass" notion. That is, the elements of volition, knowledge and intelligent decision making are subsumed by the presence
of counsel. In a practical sense, this may occasion unfortunate results such as in Daniels and
perhaps in Estelle, especially if one were to assume that the facts were not generated by
"strategic choice," where counsel's technical errors precluded petitioner's opportunity for
habeas review. However, the "practical" argument cuts both ways. As long as we proceed
under an adversarial system, representation by counsel is the only practical means to proceed
in the vast majority of cases. The problem condenses itself to the question of competency of
counsel.
63. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 3. See also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63
(1977). With the more adequate procedures now in force, evidentiary hearings would be
needed "only in the most extraordinary circumstances." Id. at 80 n.19.
64. See note 43 supra.
65. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Stone held that where the state has provided an opportunity
for full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment claim, the Constitution does not require
that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the grounds that evidence
obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at his trial. Justice
Powell delivered the opinion of the Court; Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist and Stevens joined. The Chief Justice filed a concurring opinion. Justice
Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined. Justice White filed a
dissenting opinion. The Stone majority specifically refused to consider the statutory scope of
habeas corpus. Id. at 482 n.17.
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heavily in the calculus. The majority concluded that even if there
were some marginal incremental deterrent value in isolated cases,
the "resulting advance of the . .. Fourth Amendment rights would
be outweighed by the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a
rational system of criminal justice."67
While a number of questions were left unresolved, the majority
made it perfectly clear that the categorical equation between right
and remedy, which dominated the Warren Court methodology, is
dead. The Burger Court explicitly pointed out that, while federal
courts do not lack jurisdiction over such claims, they need not apply
the exclusionary rule on habeas corpus review of a fourth amendment claim "absent a showing that the state prisoner was denied
an opportunity for a full and fair litigation of that claim at trial and
on direct review.""8 The Court's action was in a large part guided
by the recognition of the attenuated value of the deterrent effect of
66. Id. at 489-90. Guilt, innocence, or dangerousness of the defendant has rarely been
isolated as the object of focused inquiry in federal review. Judge Friendly, however, has long
supported the position that the innocence of the defendant should affect the disposition of
the claim in federal habeas corpus. See Friendly, supra note 30.
67. The social costs delineated by Justice Powell included: "(i) the effective use of
limited judicial resources; (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials; (iii) minimization
of friction between the federal and state systems of justice; and (iv) maintenance of the
constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded." Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973). Furthermore, the Stone Court observed that the
application of the exclusionary rule deflects the truth finding process and frustrates the true
aim of the criminal justice system: conviction of the guilty and acquittal of the innocent.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-91 (1976). The relative inefficiency of habeas corpus relief
is due to two factors: the small number of state convictions that are successfully challenged
in federal court, see Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 321, 333-35 (1973), and the likelihood of a low correlation between frustration of
outcome (reversal of convictions) and altered "front line" police behavior. See Cover &
Aleinikoff, supra note 3, at 1041 n.46 & 1044 n.56.
68. 428 U.S. 465, 495 n.37 (1976). The burden is, of course, on the state prisoner to
exhaust state remedies and to make a prima facie showing that he was denied "an opportunity for full and fair litigation." The Fifth Circuit has addressed the question of whether or
not "an opportunity for full and fair consideration" requires consideration at both the state
trial and state appellate court level, or whether it required consideration by only one level of
state courts. O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977). Beginning in a delightfully
facetious manner, the court stated: "[clonsistently with the ambiguity of the Supreme
Court's opinion we conclude that sometimes 'full and fair consideration' means consideration
by two tiers of state courts-sometimes it requires consideration by only one." Id. at 1213.
The court concluded,
where there are facts in dispute, full and fair consideration requires consideration
by the fact finding court, and at least the availability of meaningful appellate
review by a higher state court. Where, however, the facts are undisputed, and
there is nothing to be served by ordering a new evidentiary hearing, the full and
fair consideration requirement is satisfied where the state appellate court, presented with an undisputed factual record, gives full consideration to defendant's
Fourth Amendment claims.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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the exclusionary rule in habeas proceedings. But had the Court
intended to focus on limiting the exclusionary rule itself, there were
more direct approaches available. By focusing on the reliability of
the truth-finding process and weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule in habeas proceedings as an efficacious means of promoting
truth, the Court embraced a broader perspective, one enormously
disturbing to the dissenting Justices. 9
The approach presented by Stone will require the Court to
immediately analyze the nature of the right and the consequences
of diminution of the procedural protection. The decision to grant or
deny habeas relief will depend upon whether or not the procedure
in question furthers accurate and reliable truth-finding. 0 Analyzing
the procedure in terms of its utility, its perceived success or failure
with respect to the function which it is deemed to serve, necessitates
a balancing of interests and the values underlying those interests.
Stone did not, however, determine the relative weights to be assigned to the interests. In other words, it remains uncertain what
will be "the sensibilities that will guide the Court in assigning relative weight to normative demands and social costs."'"
69. Justice Brennan fears a broad reading of Stone: that estoppel will be applied, inter
alia, to claims of double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and use of invalid identification procedures. See 428 U.S. 465, 517-18 & n.13 (1976). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
argues vehemently, in dissent, that the "procedural safeguards mandated in the Framer's
Constitution are not admonitions to be tolerated only to the extent they serve functional
purposes that ensure that the 'guilty' are punished and the 'innocent' freed." Id. at 523-24.
Rather, the Justice continues, "every guarantee enshrined in the Constitution [has] an
independent vitality and value." Id. For substantiation of the fears Justice Brennan expressed in the Stone dissent, see the dissent of Chief Justice Burger, in Brewer v. Williams,
420 U.S. 387, 415 (1977) (arguing that Stone should have barred relitigation of the Massiah
type claim at issue in that case). See also Castaneda v. Portida, 430 U.S. 432, 507 (1977)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (it may be appropriate to extend Stone at least to discriminatory
grand jury claims since such claims may become moot subsequent to an error-free trial). Id.
at 508 n.1.
70. This standard resembles the standard of Senate Bill 567, promoted by the Justice
Department and the National Association of Attorneys General, which stated that after
passing the exhaustion requirements, the state claim which the prisoner sought to present
on habeas had to have "as its primary purpose the protection of the reliability of either the
factfinding process at the trial or the appellate process on appeal from the judgment of
conviction." S.567, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. 119 CONG. REC. 2220 § 2(a)(1973). See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
71. See Stotzky and Swan, Due Process Methodology and The PrisonerExchange Treaties: Confronting an Uncertain Calculus, 62 MINN. L. REv. (1978). (All references are to
pre-publication draft). In a sophisticated and provocative analysis of due process methodology, Professors Stotzky and Swan suggest that "there may be less concern than in the past
for those 'silent approaches and slight deviations' . . . by which 'unconstitutional practices
get their first footings.'" Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). See Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 524-25 & n.17 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The authors argue that:
Although the Justice [Powell] may have stated the rule he was fashioning overbroadly (all collateral attack is foreclosed), there is more than enough to suggest
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Moreover, it is by no means clear in which instance the Court
will implement a case by case approach, inquiring into factual matters specific to the particular petitioner's guilt and his claim of
unconstitutional procedure and in which instances the Court will
fashion categories wherein certain types of procedures are deemed
to have a positive correlation with accurate factfinding and will thus
73 the Court
be categorically protected." In Manson v. Braithwaite,
used the ad hoc approach, approving the use of identification allegedly obtained by unnecessarily suggestive procedures, which the
petitioner argued had impaired the reliability of the guilt-finding
process. The majority stated that once an improper procedure had
been used, the evidence should not be rejected, if, in the totality of
the circumstances, the evidence appeared to be reliable.7 4 In Brewer
a willingness to return in appropriate cases to the untidy task of decision by
'inclusion and exclusion' where 'differences in degree'-measured in ethical
terms-become the hallmark of Constitutional rule.
72. After reviewing the period of substantive expansion of the writ of habeas corpus, the
Stone majority concluded that the Court had never determined "whether exceptions to full
review might exist with respect to particular categories of constitutional claims." Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 478-79 (1976).
73. 432 U.S. 98 (1977). Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Justices
Marshall and Brennan dissented. In Manson, an undercover agent who had only a fleeting,
late night opportunity to observe the defendant, testified at trial about the out-of-court
identification that resulted from an unnecessarily suggestive single photo show-up. The
agent's fleeting opportunity to observe the defendant, coupled with the number of "buys"
the agent made from different suspects and defendant's plausible alibi defense, raised serious
questions about reliability of the agent's in-court identification. The Court rejected the
argument that only a strict per se rule of exclusion would have a direct and immediate impact
on law enforcement agents. Rather, the Court noted, reliability is the "linchpin" in determining the admissibility of identification testimony. The Court, therefore, applied a fourteenth
amendment fundamental fairness standard by considering the totality of the circumstances
rather than adopt a strict exclusionary rule. The opinion suggests that a totality-ofcircumstances approach limits the societal costs imposed by a sanction that excludes relevant
evidence from consideration and evaluation by the trier of fact. The Court noted that,
"inflexible rules of exclusion, that may frustrate rather than promote justice, have not been
viewed recently by this Court with unlimited enthusiasm." Id. at 113 (citing Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976)).
74. The Court's approach seems to have almost the same effect as an application of a
"harmless error" standard. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Arguably, the
Supreme Court intended that analogy. The signal from the Court may be to establish categories, through the use of a Stone estoppel, for all rights currently amenable to the "harmless
error" doctrine. See, e.g., Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969)(right to confrontation); Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18 (1967) (privilege against self-incrimination); Fahy
v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963)(right to suppress illegal evidence). Conversely, the courts
should not categorize those rights which as a matter of law cannot be subjected to the
"harmless error" standard. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963)(coerced
confession); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)(denial of counsel). The effect of this
move would be to shift the burden of proof from the state, which has to prove "harmless error"
beyond a reasonable doubt, to the defendant, who would have to prove the lack of full and
fair litigation below. See also Moore v. Illinois, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977). The Court ruled unanimously that a Chicago man convicted of a rape suffered a violation of his right to a fair trial
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v. Williams,75 however, the Court upheld the reversal of a state court
conviction, despite strong evidence of the defendant's guilt, where
the inculpatory evidence had been secured in violation of the defendant's right to counsel. Brewer signals the importance the Court
attaches to effective assistance of counsel in ensuring a full and fair
trial." Solicitude for the right to counsel may indicate a willingness
to establish broader protection for rights deemed fundamental.77
when authorities permitted his alleged victim to point him out during a preliminary court
hearing before he had obtained a lawyer. The justices ordered the case returned to an appeals
court to determine whether the identification was "harmless error" in light of other evidence
against the defendant.
75. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Williams was arrested, arraigned, and committed to jail in
Davenport, Iowa, for abducting a ten year old girl in Des Moines, Iowa. Both his lawyer in
Des Moines, and his lawyer at the.Davenport arraignment advised Williams not to make any
statements until after consulting with the Des Moines lawyer upon being returned to Des
Moines. The police officers who were to accompany Williams on the automobile drive back
to Des Mones agreed not to question him during the trip. During the trip Williams expressed
no willingness to be interrogated in the absence of an attorney. Instead he stated several times
that he would tell the whole story after seeing his lawyer in Des Moines. However, one of the
police officers, who knew that Williams was a former mental patient, and was deeply religious, sought to obtain incriminating remarks from Williams by stating to him during the
drive that he felt they should stop and locate the girl's body because her parents were entitled
to a Christian burial for the girl, who had been taken away from them on Christmas Eve.
Williams eventually made several incriminating statements in the course of the trip and
finally directed the police to the girl's body. Williams was tried and convicted of murder, over
his objections to the admission of evidence relating to or resulting from any statements he
made during the automobile ride. The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed, holding, as did the
trial court, that Williams had waived his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.
Williams then petitioned for habeas corpus in a federal district court, which held that the
evidence in question had been wrongly admitted at Williams's trial on the ground, inter alia,
that he had been denied his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, and further ruled
that he had not waived that right. The court of appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed.
76. But see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 62, 79 (1977).
77. The Court has in the past afforded special consideration to those rights "which the
Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial." Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973) (listing as fundamental the rights to counsel, confrontation, jury trial, speedy trial, and against double jeopardy). These rights have been historically held to the knowing and intelligent waiver standard. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 3,
at 1093 & n.263.
The Court has emphasized the role of effective assistance of counsel in each of the four
major cases addressed in this article. In contrast to the fourth and fifth amendments, both
framed in negative language designating what the government cannot do, the sixth amendment is framed as an affirmative command, embracing several different facets designed to
ensure fair adversarial proceedings. If the affirmative nature of the sixth amendment right
to assistance of counsel reflects a paramount value of the Framers, then the right is crucial
to the preservation of other values in the Bill of Rights. As such, it arguably should be
preserved for each individual at an increased expense to society. See Bonds v. Wainwright,
564 F.2d 1125, 1130 (5th Cir. 1977)(a valid waiver of right to effective assistance of counsel
must be preceded by an explanation to the client of what he was waiving), reh. en banc
granted; Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1977)(defendant held not to have waived
federal constitutional claim in state court where defendant's attorney filed a motion in arrest
of judgment without informing defendant of the relevant allegations). See also Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). But see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)(right to
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While the decision was complicated by reprehensible police conduct
which may have shocked the Court's conscience7 8 Brewer suggests
that the Stone estoppel would not be applied to fundamental rights
even though a claim had been fully and fairly litigated in state
courts. On the other hand, where the constitutional standards violated are prophylactic or deterrent in nature, governmental interests
would prevail."
conduct pro se defense established over objection that the states' obligation to assure a fair
trial is undermined by the exercise of that right). For a discussion of the balancing of conflicting values in Faretta,see 24 AM. U.L. REv. 897 (1976).
With dicta from the Supreme Court and with several federal circuits leading the way, a
significant shift has occurred in the standard for effective assistance of counsel. McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), is one of the cases providing such dicta. The Court there
suggested that defendants are due advice that is "within the range of competence demanded
by attorneys in criminal cases." Id. at 771 (dicta). A recent restatement of this standard
appears in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), which
opines that the test should be "based on the practices of reasonably competent attorneys
experienced in the day'to day business of representing criminal defendants in a trial court."
Id. at 656. The Fifth Circuit adopted the "reasonably effective assistance" standard in MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir.), modified per curiam en banc, 289 F.2d 928 (5th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961). However, both state and federal courts within
the circuit have been slow to break away from the traditional "farce and mockery" test.
Courts in Georgia, for example, did not adopt the Fifth Circuit's formulation until 1974. Pitt
v. Glass, 231 Ga. 638, 203 S.E.2d 515 (1974). Florida continues to adhere to the "farce and
mockery" test. See Caplinger v. State, 271 So.2d 780 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973)(per curiam). See
also Johnson v. State, 328 So.2d 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976)(per curiam); Andrews v. State, 319
So.2d 613 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975)(per curiam).
In judging both the competency of counsel and the presence of waiver, courts have tended
to distinguish between counsel who were completely ignorant of the relevant law and counsel
who were aware of the law, but may have misjudged its strength as applied to the facts of
the particular case. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the
Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. Rv. 1319, 1357-62 (1977).
The procedural right of effective assistance of counsel will be increasingly important
under the Court's recent decisions. Extensive protection of this right by liberal habeas review,
however, will undermine efficiency and finality. A great number of claims alleging various
constitutional deprivations will surely be transformed into claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Conscientious federal courts will have to either investigate the facts of the allegation

or impose stricter controls on state procedures. See Cover &Aleinikoff, supra note 3, at 1083.
See generally Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures
from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV. 927 (1973).
78. See Rochin v. United States, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
79. Many questions, of course, remain unanswered. The most significant of these questions relate to competence of counsel. Troublesome questions which will arise when right to
counsel issues are presented include: the extent to which, and in what instances, the court
may impose waiver or forfeiture upon a defendant who is personally unaware of his rights;
what constitutes a "trial decision"; and whether or not defendant acted volitionally. Questions regarding the adequacy of the forum will continue to arise. Thus, it will be necessary to
determine whether there has been adequate opportunity to air claims at the state level.
Questions relating to the expansion of the Stone doctrine will force considerable value analysis. It is probably reasonably accurate, however, to summarize the general parameters of
habeas review in the manner which follows:
I. Where a state prisoner has met the preliminary requirements of section 2254 of title
28, federal habeas review is always open if: (1) petitioner has fully complied with state
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IV. A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS OF HABEAS REVIEW
It is, of course, at the margin in each procedural area that the
judiciary is called upon to examine the extent to which collective
action can infringe upon individual rights. Much of the confusion
found in judicial opinions and secondary literature on the role of
habeas corpus review can be traced to a failure of the courts to be
explicit about underlying conflicts in objectives and values created
by the vast expansion in the habeas area. In Stone v. Powell, the
Court suggested a "pragmatic" 80 method of approaching procedural
issues. While any pragmatic approach offers something less than
quantitative answers, such a test offers a means of reaching answers
in an area where uncertainty abounds. The Court's use of a costbenefit analysis suggests an approach which emphasizes precise definition of the conflicting interests arising in the context of habeas
review. Such an approach lends itself to the task of restructuring a
procedures, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); or (2) if petitioner was somehow impeded
in presenting his contention at trial and/or on direct review. Waley v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 101
(1942).
II. Where petitioner has had the opportunity for a full and fair hearing on the merits
at state trial and appeal, there are three instances in which federal review will be barred by
a state court decision resting upon adequate and independent state grounds. First, if, with
participation of competent counsel, petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived a right
which would have been otherwise cognizable on federal review, the burden is on the state to
prove a knowing and intelligent waiver. Some courts may interpret the mere participation of
competent counsel as the equivalent of a "considered choice" by defendant. See Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). Plain error may be available to ameliorate harsh results in
some instances. Id. 514 n.2 (1976)(Powell and Stewart, JJ., concurring). Second, if petitioner,
represented by competent counsel, failed to timely raise constitutional contentions, review
will be barred unless petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice. Francis v. Henderson,
425 U.S. 536 (1976) (burden of proof is shifted from the state to show voluntary and knowing
waiver, to defendant to show cause and prejudice. Where competent counsel participated, any
trial choice may be deemed to be the equivalent of deliberate bypass). The third situation in
which federal review will be barred by a state court decision resting upon independent state
grounds exists where petitioner claims unconstitutional detention on grounds of illegal search
or seizure in violation of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976).
III. Where contentions of federal law were not resolved on the merits in state proceedings, due to petitioner's procedural default, federal review will be barred unless defendant
can show cause and prejudice. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (burden is on petitioner to figure out what constitutes cause and actual prejudice and to prove it).
IV. Federal review is unsettled where petitioner alleges procedural deficiencies in the
state trial process and the Supreme Court has not established a per se rule. The courts may
invoke the Stone balancing test by looking to the nature of the right involved and the efficacy
of the rule challenged.
Where federal review is barred, the nature of the right or remedy is not in question.
However, the procedure of the state must be adequate to provide the opportunity for defendant to present claims at trial and on direct review. A defendant must also have counsel
competent within the range of current standards.
80. 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976).
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rational decision making framework for habeas corpus analysis. The
tool is at hand by which a new equilibrium may be found.
Any serious effort to define and evaluate objectives must take
into account the utility and practicality of alternatives."s Because
alternatives exist, it follows that the search will be for optimal review rather than for maximum review. 2 Once optimality is defined
as the goal it becomes possible to understand that there is necessarily a point at which the costs of review exceed the gains. In other
words, there will be a point of diminishing returns. In analyzing
fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims, the Court has fixed the
point of diminishing returns at "full and fair consideration" by the
state. Lower courts may properly view that decision as defining the
optimal amount of review for the purpose of providing deterrence.of
unconstitutional practices in the exclusionary rule context. But
what of other areas of the law? At what point do the protections
afforded by a particular procedural rule reach the point of diminishing returns? The answer lies somewhere on a continuum and Stone
serves as the model for analysis. One might view the problem figuratively.
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81. The fact that the pendulum appears to have begun a "return" trip, after the Fay
days of almost unlimited federal review, illustrates dissatisfaction with an expansive model.
While it would doubtlessly be inaccurate to suggest that the Court perceives a return to a
purely jurisdictional perspective of federal habeas questions, it is nonetheless clear that the
judiciary in arriving at the scope of federal review must consider the capacity of the courts
and the quality of the courts' work product. The issue of scope of review requires assessing
the effect of the system on both the rights of the individual and the rights of society as a
whole. If habeas review is seen only as a means of protecting the innocent, then anything
which impugned the accuracy of the fact finding process would be relevant as a criterion to
distinguish among constitutional claims. 'If habeas is seen as what Fay terms a remedy "for
whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints," 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963), then the
relevant criterion is not just the accuracy of fact finding procedures, but also considerations
going t6 the "fairness" of the process.
82. In the ordinary sense of the word, optimal means the best average result when there
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If a "balancing test" is used' and it is assumed that the value
of a procedural rule is determined by its utility in assuring the
reliability of the factfinding process, a model continuum can be
constructed going fr6m the tenuous position of prophylactic deterrent procedure, to the firmly protected procedures deemed fundamental to the preservation of a fair trial. On the lower end of the
scale would be, for example, failure to give Miranda warnings,
claims for an illegally constituted grand jury, and brief deviations
with respect to delay of trial. These issues, similar in nature to the
exclusionary rule issues, would, in most instances, pose few difficulties under the Burger Court approach. Absent egregious circumstances, institutional or governmental interests would prevail. Further
along the continuum would be procedural issues related to the presumption of innocence, the right to trial by jury and prevention of
is a choice of combinations: the mean of two or more maximum or minimum effects that
represent the most favorable result. Similarly, in economic terms, an optimal point is reached
where both sides of the equation-after proper weighting-reach their maximum possible
potential. On the theory of optimal enforcement in the criminal law field, see Becker, Crime
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Landes & Posner, The
Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1975).
83. Of course, the balance changes depending upon the underlying values at stake. Each
justice may make different assumptions or assign different weights to the values undergirding

any particular right. For an innovative methodological approach to "due process" analysis
in "weighing up" the social values underlying specific constitutional rights and the governmental interests at stake in such a process, see Stotzky and Swan, supra note 71.
For many problems in these "open-textured" areas of the constitution ... judicial experience offers much that guides in identifying the affected values and
assaying their relative weights. Too often, subjectivity in a judge or a charge of
subjectivity by a critic stems from a failure to undertake the painstaking yet
essential task of teasing guidance out of that experience in ways that extend
beyond finding a rule sufficient to the case; a failure to find guidance in tendencies of judicial experience. Where new questions arise for which guidance is lacking, or where the final calculus is highly uncertain, important institutional sensibilities tend to insulate judgment from the vagaries of subjective bias. ...
Id.
In formulating their methodology, the authors present certain constraints which confine
and structure this approach and positively limit the charge of judicial subjectivity. First,
there is the matter of adequately particularizing the nature and extent of the contending
interests in a case. A second structural constraint which adds rigor to the process relates to
the problem of correctly identifying the governmental interests in the case. Third, the authors
suggest that it is necessary to question the conventional two tier "nature" and "form" dichotomy that has come to dominate much "due process" analysis.
The authors continue on a theoretical note, discussing their view of the legal process in
relation to decisions in the "open textured" areas of the Constitution: "[Tihe process is
inevitable and continuous. It goes to the very heart of legal reasoning and cannot be confined
but only disciplined." Id. Finally, they express the view that "[n]either commentators nor
judges can ignore the fact that the judicial mind is affected by an often unarticulated sense
of the place of the courts in the larger scheme of governances and that this sense, if fully
nurtured, ennobles both the judge and law he would lay down." Id.
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invalid lineup and identification procedures. 4 Here the decisions
are closer, because of a philosophical and emotional devotion to the
underlying rights, despite the fact that the procedural rules involved
may have little or no relevance to the accuracy of the factfinding
process. While the scales at this point on the continuum are more
evenly balanced, utopian concepts weigh heavily, probably precluding a categorical rule in favor of institutional/governmental interests. In such cases, the Court will very likely tolerate, if not promote,
an ad hoc approach. Next, there might be rules designed to protect
rights such as freedom from double jeopardy and the right to confrontation at trial. These rules are potentially vulnerable to categorical treatment if judgment is based solely upon utility in assuring
reliability of the factfinding process. The rights involved, however,
are conceivably so intertwined with concerns for protecting the individual from majoritarian oppression, as to almost certainly be protected from summary treatment. Toward the upper end of the continuum there are cases where procedural deficiencies cast serious
doubt upon the basic determination of guilt; cases involving excessive delay of trial, total reliance on hearsay evidence, coerced or
otherwise fraudulently induced confessions and guilty pleas, and
lack of effective assistance of counsel. In a general sense, these latter
rights are deemed worthy of stricter scrutiny. By giving these rights
increased protection they become both the objects of greater solicitude and the subjects of greater expenditures of resources.
While there are rarely clear answers in the search for an optimal
amount of review, the necessity for judgment continues. In the absence of specific5 Supreme Court direction, and with only our
"shared values" as a guide, the points of diminishing return will
slowly be defined by the synthesis of thought emerging from state
and federal courts." The process, as it continues, must be based
84. The Supreme Court has temporarily eased the fears of those who thought that lineup and identification procedures would be the first area to which Stone would be expanded.
See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). Justice Powell has recently suggested that it
may be appropriate to extend Stone to discriminatory grand jury claims since such claims
may be "mooted" by subsequent error-free trial. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 506 n.1
(1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
85. For a discussion of "shared values" as the "controlling consensus" in most constitutional litigation, see Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 284-311 (1973). See generally, R. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
86. In the brief time since the decisions in Stone, Estelle, Francis, and Sykes, the courts
have begun to respond. Movement toward expansion of the Stone estoppel is guarded.
Compare, Green v. Massey, 546 F.2d 51, 53 (5th Cir. 1977)(double jeopardy is "specifically
proclaimed 'personal constitutional' right"); United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Jeffes, 420 F.
Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1976)(Stone estoppel not applicable to line-up and identification claims);
Sedswick v. Superior Court of the District of Columbia, 417 F. Supp. 386 (D.D.C. 1976)(dou-
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upon careful particularization of four factors: (1) the interests at
stake; (2) the values attached to those interests; (3) the functional
utility of procedures designed to protect the interest; and (4) the
extent of the inherent constraint of finite resources. Only by explicitly recognizing and clearly articulating those factors, can objective
weighing of interests inform the search for a new equilibrium in
habeas corpus review. Only by constructing a model which recognizes these factors can an optimal amount of review be obtained.
Only by securing an optimal amount of review can costs to both
society and the individual be minimized. The Supreme Court in
Stone v. Powell has offered an analysis which provides guidance in
the form of both structure and mode. It is willing to attribute to
lower courts, state and federal, the capacity and the ingeniousness
to interpret rules to suit contemporary demands within the parameters defined by the Court and within the framework of the Constitution.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Writ of Habeas Corpus has served throughout our history
as a conduit by which questions of constitutional principles and
notions of fundamental fairness are funneled to the courts. By imble jeopardy clause is an established individual constitutional right and stands on different
footing from the exclusionary rule), with Richardson v. Stone, 421 F. Supp. 577, 579 (N.D.
Cal. 1976)(Stone estoppel applicable to Mirandaclaims which "do not question the reliability
of a statement"); Szaraz v. Perini, 421 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ohio 1976)(Stone estoppel applicable
to line-up and identification claims not affecting the reliability of identification). See also
O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977)(fourth amendment claim never raised
at trial or considered on merits in any state post-conviction proceeding barred by opportunity
below for full and fair hearing).
Questions arising under Estelle, Francis, and Sykes have centered on issues of effective
assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Bonds v. Wainwright, 564 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1977) (waiver
of right to effective assistance of counsel must be an intelligent, understanding, and voluntary decision); Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1977) (choice made by counsel and
not participated in by defendant does not automatically bar habeas relief). See also, Ennis
v. LeFevre, 560 F.2d 1072 (2d Cir. 1977); Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977).
The lack of unanimity in this area is evidenced by the vigorous dissents in O'Berry and
Bonds. Justice Goldberg's statement that "[tihe exclusionary rule has been stoned, but is
not dead," O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1221 (5th Cir. 1977), revealed his dissatisfaction with the current trend. Similarly, Justice Tjoflat in Bonds attacked the analysis, the
conclusion and the ramifications of the circuit's newly formulated waiver standard with
regard to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1132. The Supreme Court has reviewed the
possibility of a categorical position in identification procedure cases, but upon the facts
presented, declined to extend the Stone doctrine. Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98. See
note 73 supra. The Court has declined to review the question of whether or not the Stone
estoppel should be extended to fifth and sixth amendment claims in cases in which there was
opportunity for full and fair hearing of all claims in state courts. Watson v. Jago, 558 F.2d
330 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub. nom, Jago v. Papp, 98 S. Ct. 439 (1977).
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posing stricter constraints upon federal courts by extending the res
judicata effect of state decisions, the Supreme Court has forced
renewed and more precise analysis of all areas of habeas corpus
review. Once again the duty-and the opportunity-is thrust upon
the judiciary to thoughtfully analyze the role of habeas corpus review in the federalist tradition, and to weave into the fabric in the
"open-textured areas of the law," sound principles upon which the
concept of ordered liberty may be nurtured.

